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NOTES
FAITHLESS ELECTORS: KEEPING THE TIES
THAT BIND
Scott Eckl*
Every four years, the United States chooses a president and vice president.
Millions of Americans exercise the right to vote, believing that they are voting
for the candidates of their choice. In actuality, 538 relatively unknown party
insiders known as electors officially choose the president a month later in
fifty-one obscure meetings. Most of the time, these electors mirror the
popular votes. However, whether these electors are required to do so and
whether the states can enforce laws requiring them to do so are open
questions. The Tenth Circuit recently declared statutes that bind electors
unconstitutional. A few months before that decision, the Washington State
Supreme Court ruled that these laws and their enforceability are
constitutional. This Note identifies the arguments for each position, analyzes
the strengths and weaknesses of each position, and identifies any issues not
considered either by legal scholars or by the courts. Finally, this Note agrees
with the Washington State Supreme Court that these laws are constitutional
and implores the U.S. Supreme Court to affirm the Washington State
Supreme Court’s decision in June 2020 before one of those 538 electors can
change the outcome of a future presidential election.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the November 2016 presidential election, U.S. citizens outraged
by the result led an unprecedented campaign to pressure electors to vote for
someone other than two major party nominees, Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton.1 Many Republican electors reported receiving “tens of thousands”

1. See Gabriel Debenedetti & Kyle Cheney, Progressive Groups Plan to Protest
Electoral College Vote, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/
12/electoral-college-vote-protests-232311 [https://perma.cc/XTX7-77DY].
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of emails pleading them to vote for someone other than Trump.2 One
Republican elector in Michigan reported that he received “cardboard trays
full of letters asking [him] not to vote for the person the people of the state
of Michigan chose.”3 Some Democratic electors, in an effort to stop Trump
from becoming president, advocated voting for another Republican in the
hopes that Republican electors would join them.4
In the official tally, seven electors defected and voted for a candidate other
than Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton.5 Two states, Colorado and
Washington, chose to enforce their laws against these “faithless electors,”
which prompted litigation challenging the constitutionality of these laws
under the Twelfth Amendment.6 With little U.S. Supreme Court precedent
on the issue, the litigation resulted in contradictory rulings.7 In In re Guerra,8
the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that these laws are constitutional.9
Conversely, in Baca v. Colorado Department of State,10 the Tenth Circuit
ruled that these laws are unconstitutional.11 The electors in the Washington
case and the state in the Colorado case have appealed to the Supreme Court,12

2. See id.
3. Chad Livengood, Trump’s Michigan Electors Endure Deluge of Threats, Lobbying to
Change Votes, DET. NEWS (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/
2016/12/18/mich-electors/95601280/ [https://perma.cc/5CM6-UQEA].
4. One Washington elector explained that her defection meant “casting [her] electoral
college ballot not for Clinton, who won [her] state of Washington, but for a compromise
Republican candidate who other Republican electors can rally around to stop Trump getting
elected.” Ed Pilkington, ‘Faithless Electors’ Explain Their Last-Ditch Attempt to Stop Donald
Trump, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/
electoral-college-faithless-electors-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/R63U-QH9Z].
5. See Kiersten Schmidt & Wilson Andrews, A Historic Number of Electors Defected,
and Most Were Supposed to Vote for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/19/us/elections/electoral-college-results.html
[https://perma.cc/7UG9-VV2T]. Two Texas Republican electors voted for Ron Paul and John
Kasich, respectively; one Hawaii Democratic elector voted for Bernie Sanders; three
Washington Democratic electors voted for Colin Powell and one voted for Faith Spotted
Eagle. Id. Three other electors in Colorado, Maine, and Minnesota attempted to vote for
someone other than their party’s nominee but either changed their minds or were forced out
by their states. See id.
6. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 902 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.); In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash.
2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19465) (mem.); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
7. Though they came to different conclusions, both the Washington State Supreme Court
and the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ray v. Blair, 343
U.S. 214 (1952), which held that party pledges in primaries were constitutional.
8. 441 P.3d 807 (Wash. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S.
Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.).
9. See id. at 808.
10. 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19518) (mem.).
11. See id. at 902.
12. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020)
(No. 19-465), 2020 WL 254167.
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which will hear the case on April 28, 2020, and should issue a decision on
June 29, 2020.13
The seven faithless votes in 2016 did not alter the election.14 But these
votes, the contradictory rulings, and the looming 2020 election have
reinvigorated a debate about the Electoral College.15 Since the Supreme
Court has yet to definitively address the issue of binding electors, many states
have enacted their own laws.16 Thirty-two states and the District of
Columbia have laws, known as binding statutes, prohibiting elector
discretion but seventeen of those states do not prescribe any consequence for
an elector who deviates from the law.17 Absent a clear Supreme Court ruling
or a constitutional amendment, the law on this issue will remain inconsistent.
Part I of this Note discusses the structure of the Electoral College, as
described in Article II and the Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
It then briefly discusses the history of the Electoral College, binding statutes,
and faithless electors. Finally, it discusses the jurisprudence relevant to a
state’s authority to bind its electors. Part II outlines the opposing viewpoints
on the constitutionality of elector independence and states’ authority to
impose binding statutes. Part III argues that binding statutes are
constitutional and discusses the positive and negative effects that the
upcoming Supreme Court ruling could have on the issue and on future
elections.
I. THE SMOKE-FILLED ROOM: THE BIRTH OF A CONTROVERSIAL SYSTEM
AND HOW IT HAS BEEN USED AND INTERPRETED THROUGHOUT HISTORY
The Electoral College was highly controversial during the Constitutional
Convention and has been throughout U.S. history. This Part discusses the
structure of the Electoral College. It discusses the founders’ original intent
for the Electoral College, the history of the Electoral College, and the
enactment of the Twelfth Amendment. It also discusses faithless electors
13. See Justices to Consider Faithless Electors, Ahead of 2020 Vote, POLITICO (Jan. 17,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/17/justices-to-consider-faithless-electorsahead-of-2020-vote-100631 [https://perma.cc/Z7DT-WWWX]. These dates may, however,
change as the Court responds to the COVID-19 outbreak. See Press Release, U.S. Supreme
Court, Postponement of March Oral Arguments (Mar. 16, 2020), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_03-16-20 [https://perma.cc/4T9SN6UE] (announcing postponement of oral arguments scheduled in March and early April due
to the coronavirus outbreak).
14. See Presidential Election Results: Donald Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/2PKE-MFTB].
15. See Editorial, Fix the Electoral College—or Scrap It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/opinion/electoral-college.html
[https://perma.cc/
N9Q2-DXGY].
16. See Jim Brunner, Four Washington State Electors Break Ranks and Don’t Vote for
Clinton, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/
four-washington-electors-break-ranks-and-dont-vote-for-clinton/
[https://perma.cc/E8T7YQPW].
17. See Electoral College: Faithless Elector State Laws, FAIR VOTE, https://
www.fairvote.org/the_electoral_college#faithless_electors [https://perma.cc/Y725-BDKQ]
(last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
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and actions by states and political parties to control them. Finally, it
discusses how the courts have interpreted the electors’ roles and states’
authority to control them.
A. What Is the Electoral College?
The Electoral College, created by the Constitution, is composed of a group
of people called electors who officially vote for our country’s president and
vice president.18 Each state contributes a certain number of electors to this
group based on the state’s number of congressional representatives.19
On Election Day, people vote for electors—not for the presidential or vicepresidential candidates.20 Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, as
amended by the Twelfth Amendment, sets the formal process for electing the
president.21 First, each state appoints its designated number of electors.22
Then, the electors across the country meet on the same day in their respective
states to cast their votes for president and vice president.23 Originally, the
Constitution required the electors to vote for two candidates for president:
the candidate with the highest number of votes would become president and
The Twelfth
the next runner-up would become vice president.24
Amendment, however, changed this so that the electors would vote
separately for president and vice president.25 The presidential candidate with
the most votes becomes president if the number of votes constitutes a
majority of the electors.26

18. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. The term “Electoral College” does not appear anywhere
in the Constitution. See JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 2 (4th ed. 2013).
19. “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XII. There are 538 electors, derived from the total number of senators (100), the total
number of members of the House of Representatives (435), and three additional members from
the District of Columbia. See Distribution of Electoral Votes, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/allocation.html
[https://perma.cc/GN9V-T7A2] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
21. See id.
22. See id.; see also 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“The electors . . . shall be appointed . . . on the
Tuesday next after the first Monday in November . . . .”).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also 3 U.S.C.
§ 7 (“The electors . . . shall meet and give their votes on the first Monday after the second
Wednesday in December . . . .”).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The two
candidates must be from different states. See id. The “inhabitancy rule” satisfied some
framers’ worries about regionalism and encouraged electors to adopt a more national outlook.
See Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and Overview, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 972 n.44 (2016).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
26. If no presidential candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, then the election
is thrown to the House of Representatives, where each state gets one vote. See id. If the vicepresidential candidate does not receive a majority of the electoral votes, the election is thrown
to the Senate. See id.
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The Constitution is silent as to who can be an elector, except that it
explicitly states that electors cannot be senators or representatives or
someone “holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.”27
Currently, most states allow political parties to choose a slate of electors to
represent their respective candidates.28 State laws vary as to how a political
party chooses its specific electors.29 These electors generally remain
unknown to the public because the “short-form” ballot only contains the
names of the candidates for president and vice president.30 In every state, a
vote for the candidate of that particular party is a vote for that party’s slate of
electors.31
B. The Constitutional Convention’s Understanding of the Electoral College
and the Subsequent Ratification of the Twelfth Amendment
Selecting the process that would choose the president was one of the more
elaborate debates among the fifty-five delegates to the 1787 Constitutional
Convention.32 The framers wanted to give the people a voice after first
rejecting a proposal to have Congress appoint the president.33 After several
weeks of debating between a popular vote and an electoral system, the
framers created a “Committee of Eleven” (one delegate per state) to resolve
the issue.34 This committee drafted the plan that resembles the Electoral
College used today.35
In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton defended the Electoral
College and advocated for its ratification.36 The electors were to be “men
most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station” and “most
likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. In 1876, for
example, a postmaster in Oregon resigned so that he could be eligible to serve as an elector.
See ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 32 (2006).
28. See Distribution of Electoral Votes, supra note 19.
29. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-502(2) (2020) (by state convention); N.Y. ELEC.
LAW § 6-102 (McKinney 2020) (by state committee); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2878 (2020) (by
party presidential nominee); WIS. STAT. § 8.18 (2020) (by party nominees for state
legislature).
30. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 2.
31. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-100 (“Each vote cast for the candidates of any
party . . . for president and vice president of the United States . . . shall be deemed to be cast
for the candidates for elector of such party . . . .”).
32. See 2 JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1411 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851).
33. See id. § 1456.
34. See John D. Feerick, The Electoral College—Why It Ought to Be Abolished, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1968).
35. See BRIAN L. FIFE, REFORMING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN AMERICA: TOWARD MORE
DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 83–84 (2010). As one political scientist who summarized
the proceedings stated: “Every solution seemed worse than the rest. The arrangement they
finally cobbled together at the last minute was adopted more out of desperation, perhaps, than
out of any great confidence in its success.” Id. at 84. The plan passed by a vote of nine to two.
Id. at 83–84.
36. See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787–1804, at 17 (1994).
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an investigation.”37 They were to “enter upon the task, free from any sinister
bias.”38 Hamilton further wrote that this process would guarantee that the
president “will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent
degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”39
There was little debate during the convention on the exact role of the
electors.40 Some argued that “[t]he Electors will be strangers to the several
candidates and of course unable to decide on their comparative merits.”41
Further references to the role of electors and their contemplated
independence, however, are found in The Federalist Papers, particularly
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 68.42
After the country’s first two contested elections, in 1796 and 1800,
Congress felt the need to amend Article II.43 The original provision allowed
electors to vote for two people for president, which resulted in pairing
political rivals as president and vice president.44 The provision also allowed
the House of Representatives, when no presidential candidate received a
majority of the electoral vote, to choose among the top five candidates.45
Because of this provision, Congress went through thirty-six rounds of voting
in 1800.46 The differing procedures that the states used to appoint the
electors47 and the rise of political parties had drastically altered the system
envisioned by the framers.48
The Twelfth Amendment addressed some of these flaws by simplifying
the process, requiring presidential electors to vote separately for president
and vice president.49 The 1804 ratification of the Twelfth Amendment
represents the most significant constitutional change to the Electoral
College.50
37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 410 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898).
38. Id. at 411.
39. Id. at 412.
40. See Feerick, supra note 34, at 9 n.44.
41. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 501 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937).
42. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 37.
43. See KURODA, supra note 36, at 110–14.
44. Some Federalist-leaning electors only voted for John Adams for president to assure
an Adams presidency. This tactic, however, resulted in the odd pairing of the Federalist
Adams and Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson for vice president. See id. at 65–66.
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
46. NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 40 (1981).
47. See id. at 247. In 1796, legislatures in seven states directly selected electors and six
states chose electors by popular vote. See id. In 1800, legislatures in ten states directly selected
electors and five states chose electors by popular vote. See id.
48. See id. at 41.
49. Additionally, if the election was thrown to the House, the Twelfth Amendment
required the House to pick from the top three electoral vote-getters. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XII.
50. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 947–49 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.) (describing the history of the Electoral
College). The Twenty-Third Amendment granted the District of Columbia the number of
electors equal to that of the least populous state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
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C. What Does the Electoral College Look like Today?
Political parties play the largest role in determining the electors.51
Notably, the Constitution does not mention—and in fact sought to avoid—
the influence of political parties.52 Political parties, however, began to form
almost immediately during George Washington’s administration and became
more prominent after Washington declined to seek a third term.53 In the 1796
election, state political parties began securing pledges from their electors.54
Since that election, electors have mostly been party loyalists who have taken
some pledge or oath to support their party’s nominees.55 In 2020, thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia legally require elector candidates to sign
a pledge.56 These pledges and the consequences for breaking them differ
among the states.57
While some states do not impose any penalties for breaking a pledge, other
states impose penalties of varying degrees. Seventeen states58 and the
District of Columbia59 have laws that bind electors without providing for any
enforcement.60 Eleven states have laws that cancel the elector’s vote and
replace the elector.61 Two states impose a penalty on the elector but record

51. Robert M. Alexander, Lobbying the Electoral College: The Potential for Chaos, in
ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 159, 164–65 (Gary Bugh ed.,
2010).
52. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 20.
53. See id. at 21.
54. See Alexander, supra note 51, at 164.
55. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229 n.16 (1952).
56. See Electoral College, supra note 17.
57. See Distribution of Electoral Votes, supra note 19. Unpledged electors—those
without either a binding state law or a party pledge—ceased to exist after the 1800 election,
only to reappear again in 1960 when slates of unpledged electors won in Southern states in
opposition to the Democrats’ support for civil rights initiatives. See Feerick, supra note 34, at
21.
58. These states are Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Electoral College, supra note 17.
59. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.08(g) (2020).
60. Three states—California, Hawaii, and Wisconsin—have language in their binding
statutes that restrict their electors to voting for their party’s candidate “if both candidates are
alive.” See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6906 (West 2020); see also Zachary J. Shapiro, Note,
Free Agency: The Constitutionality of Methods That Influence a Presidential Elector’s Ability
to Exercise Personal Judgment, 26 CARDOZO J.L. & POL’Y 395, 422–24 (2018). This language
allows some discretion in a scenario where a candidate dies after the November election day
but before the December meeting date. Shapiro, supra, at 422–24. National parties have
contingencies in place if a death occurs, but electors may not feel obligated to vote for that
nominee. See id. This has happened twice in history. See Feerick, supra note 34, at 23–24.
61. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Maine, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, and Washington. See Electoral College, supra note 17. In 2016,
Washington imposed a fine of $1000. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), cert.
granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.).
In June 2019, the state legislature repealed that law and replaced it with one that does not
impose a monetary penalty but replaces the faithless elector and fails to count their vote. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.330 (repealed 2019).
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the vote as cast.62 Two states impose a penalty on the elector and cancel the
vote.63
An elector who abstains or votes contrary to their pledge and their state’s
laws may be called a “faithless elector.”64 A recent estimate indicates that,
in the history of presidential elections, there have been 167 faithless electors
whose votes were officially counted.65 These electors’ votes deviated for
various reasons,66 but none of their votes affected the outcome of an
election.67 After a long hiatus, ten of the last eighteen elections had at least
one faithless elector.68 In 2016, there were seven faithless electors.69 This
marked the greatest number of faithless electors in an election since 1872.70
While the Supreme Court has occasionally heard elector-related cases, there
is no established legal doctrine regarding faithless electors in general
elections.
D. The Legal Status of Presidential Electors
Presidential electors serve a somewhat limited federal function. In
Burroughs v. United States,71 the Court ruled that “presidential electors are
not officers or agents of the federal government, [but] they exercise federal
functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the
Constitution.”72 The Court implied that the exercise of this federal function

62. See Electoral College, supra note 17. These states, New Mexico and South Carolina,
allow the government to bring a criminal action against the elector. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 115-9 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (2020).
63. These states are Oklahoma, which imposes a fine and holds the elector guilty of a
misdemeanor, and North Carolina, which imposes a $500 fine. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163212 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 10-109 (2020).
64. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 95. Scholars who believe that the Constitution
originally intended electors to exercise independent judgment consider the term ironic because
the “faithlessness” exhibited is only to their pledges and not to the Constitution itself. Id. at
96.
65. See Electoral College, supra note 17.
66. See id. Electors have cast seventy-one faithless votes for candidates who died after
the November election day but before the electors met in December. Id. Twenty-nine electors
have abstained or have cast an abnormal vote. Id. Sixty-seven have voted for a different
candidate altogether on their own initiative. Id.
67. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 98.
68. See Alexander, supra note 51, at 161; see also Electoral College, supra note 17.
Faithless electors have been recorded in the elections of 1948, 1956, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1976,
1988, 2000, 2004, and 2016. Electoral College, supra note 17.
69. It could have been ten but three were either disqualified or changed their votes. See
Schmidt & Andrews, supra note 5.
70. See Electoral College, supra note 17. In 1872, sixty-three Democratic electors voted
for someone other than their nominee, Horace Greeley, because he died after the November
election day but before the Electoral College meeting. Id.
71. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
72. See id. at 545 (citation omitted); see also In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890)
(“[Electors] are no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the
state legislatures when acting as electors of federal senators, or the people of the States when
acting as electors of representatives in Congress.”).
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would not be immune from the federal government’s interest in keeping an
election free from corruption.73
In exercising this federal function, electors act within the authority of the
states, which have “plenary power” over appointing electors.74 In
McPherson v. Blacker,75 the Court recognized that the Constitution does not
provide the exact method of appointing electors, but it “leaves it to the [state]
legislature exclusively to define the method.”76 The Court suggested that
historical practices and practical implications allow for a more flexible
interpretation of the Twelfth Amendment, granting states this autonomy.77
The Court has continued to rely on the Electoral College’s history and its
practical implications in granting states more authority.78 In Ray v. Blair,79
the Court declared that “[t]his long-continued practical interpretation of the
constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge . . . weighs heavily in
considering the constitutionality of a pledge.”80 The Court later admitted that
while “[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for
electors,” “[h]istory has now favored the voter, and in each of the several
States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors.”81 The Court
has acknowledged that citizens have a constitutional right to vote for the
president when “the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the
means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college”
and that such “right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental.”82
The Court, however, has yet to explicitly address whether such longstanding historical practice eliminates elector independence in general
elections. In Ray, the Court addressed an Alabama Democratic Party rule
requiring elector candidates in primaries to sign a pledge to support the
party’s nominees.83 Edmund Blair, an otherwise qualified electoral
candidate, refused to sign the pledge and thus the party refused to certify his
candidacy.84 In a narrow ruling, the Court reasoned that no provision in the
73. See Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 546–47.
74. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
75. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
76. Id. at 27.
77. See id. at 36 (“But we can perceive no reason for holding that the power confided to
the States by the Constitution has ceased to exist because the operation of the system has not
fully realized the hopes of those by whom it was created.”); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (declaring that, so long as no other provision in the Constitution is violated,
“[Article II, § 1] does grant extensive power to the States to pass laws regulating the selection
of electors”).
78. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229–30 (1952).
79. 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
80. Id. at 229–30 (“However, even if such promises of candidates . . . are legally
unenforceable because violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector . . . it
would not follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is unconstitutional.”). Id. at
230.
81. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
82. Id.
83. See Ray, 343 U.S. at 215.
84. See id.
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Constitution barred a political party, in a primary for its electors, from
requiring pledges to support its nominees.85 The Court reasoned that
involvement in a party is voluntary and thus one must comply with the party’s
rules.86 Justice Robert Jackson, however, observed in his dissent that the
framers intended electors to be “free agents” who would “exercise an
independent and nonpartisan judgment.”87 In rejecting the majority’s
emphasis on historical practices, Justice Jackson reasoned that the Court
could not use custom to amend the Constitution.88
The Court’s ruling in Ray, which was limited to primary elections,89 left
state and federal courts to address the issue in the context of general elections.
Before 2016, state courts in California,90 Nebraska,91 and New York,92 as
well as a federal district court in Michigan,93 ruled that binding statutes in
general elections were constitutional. State courts in Alabama,94 Kansas,95
and Ohio,96 however, ruled that states could not restrict elector
independence.
The question left unaddressed in Ray regarding pledges in general
elections and the faithless votes in the 2016 election prompted litigation in
four jurisdictions. Three Washington electors voted contrary to their pledges
to vote for Hillary Clinton.97 Under state law at the time, the Washington
secretary of state fined them each $1000 for failing to uphold their pledge.98
The three electors took their case all the way to the Supreme Court of
Washington, arguing that the law and the fine imposed were

85. See id. at 231.
86. See id. at 230.
87. Id. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 233. Justice Jackson further advocated for abolishing the whole system
altogether and instituting a direct popular vote for president. See id. at 234.
89. See id. at 231 (majority opinion).
90. Spreckels v. Graham, 228 P. 1040, 1045 (Cal. 1924) (declaring that electors use no
judgment or discretion).
91. State ex rel. Neb. Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Wait, 138 N.W. 159, 165 (Neb.
1912) (suggesting that states had the right to remove electors if they violated pledges because
voters vote for “entire strangers” and a faithless vote “would be repugnant to every sense of
honor”).
92. Thomas v. Cohen, 262 N.Y.S. 320, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (ruling that short-form ballots,
party primaries, and nominating conventions have drastically changed the presidential election
process and positing that the Twelfth Amendment would have been written differently if these
present-day conditions had existed at the time).
93. Gelineau v. Johnson, 904 F. Supp. 2d 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (assuming that Ray
strongly suggested that a state’s enforcement of a pledge would be constitutional).
94. Op. of the Justices, 34 So. 2d 598, 599–600 (Ala. 1948) (believing that the
Constitution’s language clearly indicates that electors can exercise judgment). However, this
was an advisory opinion issued before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ray.
95. Breidenthal v. Edwards, 46 P. 469, 470 (Kan. 1896) (affirming the position that
electors are under no legal obligation to uphold their party’s pledges).
96. State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899, 908–09 (Ohio 1948) (suggesting that
pledges are only enforced by a moral obligation, not a legal one).
97. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v.
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.).
98. See id.
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unconstitutional.99 The court ruled against them and declared the law and
the fine constitutional.100 Electors in California and Minnesota also
challenged their states’ laws, but the courts in those states denied the electors’
proposed preliminary injunctions, which would have precluded the states
from certifying ballots that complied with the states’ binding statutes.101
In Colorado, one faithless elector voted contrary to his pledge to vote for
Hillary Clinton.102 After failing to obtain an injunction against the state, the
state removed him, cancelled his vote, and replaced him with an elector who
voted for Hillary Clinton.103 He sued the state, but the district court ruled
that Colorado’s binding statute was constitutional and the state’s actions were
permissible.104 The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed that decision and
became the first court to expressly rule that a state’s binding statute was
unconstitutional.105
II. A STATE OF BATTLEGROUND: ELECTOR INDEPENDENCE VERSUS STATE
AUTHORITY
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ray, the long-standing state practice of
having binding statutes requiring electors to vote for the candidate who won
the state’s popular vote, and electors’ historical adherence to these statutes
suggest universal acceptance of the statutes’ constitutionality. Indeed, until
the Tenth Circuit’s decision, no court has ever explicitly declared a binding
statute unconstitutional.106 However, the Tenth Circuit’s decision and the
Washington State Supreme Court’s contradictory ruling have revived the
issue.
This Part discusses the legal issues of elector independence and binding
statutes in light of Baca v. Colorado Department of State. It discusses
arguments raised by the Tenth Circuit, the parties in the litigation, and other
courts and legal scholars that binding statutes are unconstitutional. It then
outlines the arguments raised by the Washington State Supreme Court and
other courts and scholars that binding statutes are constitutional. Finally, it
explores the text of the Constitution, the framers’ intent, and electors’ roles
and historical practices.

99. See id.
100. See id. at 807.
101. See Abdurrahman v. Dayton, No. 16-cv-4279 (PAM/HB), 2016 WL 7428193, at *2–
4 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2016); Koller v. Brown, 224 F. Supp. 3d 871, 874 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
102. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 902–03 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.).
103. See id. at 904.
104. See id. at 901–05.
105. See id. at 956.
106. See supra Part I.D.
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A. The Unconstitutionality of Binding Statutes
When interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme Court first looks at the
text.107 The Court has, however, afforded considerable weight to
governmental and historical practices when the issue concerns “the
respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the
people.”108 The Constitution should be “understood by the voters; its words
and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
technical meaning.”109 This section discusses the arguments that binding
statutes are unconstitutional because they are contradictory to the plain
language of the Twelfth Amendment and to the framers’ original intent. It
also discusses how, historically, electors have been understood to be
independent.
1. The Twelfth Amendment’s Language Prohibits States from Controlling
Electors
According to the Tenth Circuit in Baca, the language of the Twelfth
Amendment exclusively limits states’ power to the appointment of
presidential electors.110 The Twelfth Amendment does not mention the states
after assigning them the power to appoint the electors on the date selected by
Congress.111 The language provides specific details as to how the electors
should cast their votes—without mentioning the states’ ability to remove
them or direct who they must vote for.112 The states are notably absent from
the process once appointment occurs because the Amendment allows electors
“themselves” to make distinct lists, certify the votes, and transmit them to the
Senate.113 In fact, once voting begins, there is nothing in the Amendment’s
language that says that a state can interfere with the process.114
The Amendment’s use of the terms “elector,” “vote,” and “ballot” could
also be instructive in suggesting that states cannot direct who electors should
vote for.115 Contemporaneous definitions of the words seem to reveal that
the framers intended electors to exercise discretion in casting votes.116
107. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 459 (2002) (starting with a textual analysis of the
Constitution before considering historical practices).
108. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
109. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931).
110. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 942.
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
112. See id.; Baca, 935 F.3d at 942.
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
114. See id.
115. Baca, 935 F.3d at 943.
116. One dictionary defined the term “elector” as one that “has a vote in the choice of any
officer.” 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. F. & C.
Rivington 1785). Webster’s dictionary defined “ballot” as “to choose or vote by ballot.” NOAH
WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New Haven, Sidney’s
Press 1806); see also Baca, 935 F.3d at 943–44; Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188
(1824) (“The enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted
it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended
what they have said.”).
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Further, the term “ballot” could also imply that the electors’ votes would be
secret.117 A state’s ability to fine or remove an elector on the basis of their
vote would require the elector’s vote to be known, which would be
inconsistent with a secret ballot.118 As the Tenth Circuit observed, these
definitions “have a common theme: they all imply the right to make a choice
or voice an individual opinion.”119
The meaning of “elector” as someone who has the right to exercise
discretion could further be supported by the use of the word in other parts of
the Constitution.120 In Article I, “electors” refers to citizens voting for
congressional representatives.121 There are no binding statutes restricting
who these electors should vote for.122 Because the Supreme Court reads
terms consistently throughout the Constitution, the electors referenced in the
Twelfth Amendment may have the same discretion as the electors described
in Article I.123
Other phrases in the Twelfth Amendment could also imply that electors
can exercise discretion and judgment. The only restrictions that the Twelfth
Amendment places on electors are that they cannot vote for two people from
the same state for president and vice president and that they cannot hold
federal offices of “Trust or Profit” in the federal government.124 This latter
restriction would be unnecessary if electors merely transmitted the popular
vote and did not exercise some independent discretion.125 The additional
requirement that electors are to meet “in their respective States” would also
be unnecessary if the electors functioned merely as rubber stamps.126 These
precautions were designed to protect against corruption—an evil that could
only arise if electors had discretion.127
Additionally, one scholar argues that binding statutes unconstitutionally
place another qualification on electors that is not explicitly listed in the
Twelfth Amendment.128 In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,129 the
117. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 41, at 390 (“It is
expected and required by the Constitution, that the votes shall be secret and unknown.”).
118. See Robert J. Delahunty, Is the Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act
Constitutional?, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE·NOVO 165, 175.
119. Baca, 935 F.3d at 945 (analyzing multiple dictionary definitions of the words
“elector,” “vote,” and “ballot”).
120. See id.
121. “[T]he Electors in each state shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (confirming that an
“elector” meant a voter).
122. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government.”).
123. See Baca, 935 F.3d. at 946–47; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 265 (1990) (interpreting a term of art in different parts of the Constitution consistently).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
125. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 14–15.
126. See Delahunty, supra note 118, at 174–75.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 175–76.
129. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).

2020]

FAITHLESS ELECTORS

1937

Supreme Court ruled that the Article I qualifications for election to the House
of Representatives were exhaustive and accordingly found an Arkansas law
that attempted to add an additional qualification unconstitutional.130
Similarly, it is plausible to read the Twelfth Amendment restrictions on
electors as exclusive, ruling out the possibility of an additional condition that
electors are bound to vote for a certain candidate.131
2. The Supremacy Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and Constitutional
Appointment Power Prohibit States from Controlling Electors
Elector independence can further be supported by the Supremacy Clause
because electors perform a federal function with which a state cannot
interfere.132 The Supremacy Clause establishes that the Constitution and
federal laws are supreme to state laws and cannot be controlled by the
states.133 The Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot interfere with,
limit, or control federal functions.134 This is true even if the person
performing the federal function is appointed by the state.135 The Supreme
Court has also ruled that electors perform “and discharge duties in virtue of
authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States.”136 Therefore,
the only authority that would allow states to control electors would have to
be implicitly or explicitly found in the Constitution.137
Notably, the Tenth Amendment does not overcome the absence of any
language in the Twelfth Amendment explicitly granting the states the right
to control electors.138 The Tenth Amendment reserves powers not delegated
by the Constitution to the states.139 If a power is not explicitly referenced in
the Constitution, the silence is sometimes “interpreted as an intent that the
relevant power be retained by the states” under the Tenth Amendment.140
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that the Tenth Amendment can only

130. See id. at 780 (ruling unconstitutional a law to deny ballot access to any representative
who had served three terms in the House or two in the Senate).
131. See Delahunty, supra note 118, at 176.
132. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934); Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of
State, 935 F.3d 887, 937–38 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020)
(No. 19-518) (mem.)
133. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Baca, 935 F.3d at 938.
134. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1992) (“[A] federal function derived from
the Federal Constitution . . . transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of
a State.”).
135. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (ruling that state law cannot interfere
with the state legislators’ role in ratifying amendments); see also Cunningham v. Neagle, 135
U.S. 1, 75 (1890) (ruling that a federal official cannot be guilty of violating a state law for
conduct authorized by federal law).
136. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
137. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 938.
138. See id. at 938–39.
139. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
140. Baca, 935 F.3d at 938; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“[T]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”).
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reserve rights that existed before the Constitution was ratified.141 Because
electors were created under the Constitution, the power to control them is not
reserved to the states and must be expressly delegated in the Constitution.142
In the absence of an express delegation, such a power does not exist.143
Additionally, such a power cannot be found explicitly in the Appointments
Clause.144 The Supreme Court’s analysis of the Appointments Clause
recognizes that the power to appoint, control, and remove officers is based
on the president’s obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed.145 As the Tenth Circuit observed, however, this principle extends
solely to executive power.146 When states appoint electors, they are not
selecting them to carry out a function for which the state is ultimately
responsible.147 Electors are not subordinate to the state; they exercise a
federal function when casting their ballots.148 There is no obligation in the
Twelfth Amendment that the electors faithfully perform their function, unlike
the obligation imposed on the president by Article II.149 Additionally, the
power to appoint is separate from the power to control. Before the enactment
of the Seventeenth Amendment requiring popular election of senators, the
state legislatures had plenary power to select senators.150 The legislatures,
however, did not have any power to legally bind a senator to vote in a certain
way.151 Similarly, while presidents appoint federal judges, they have no
power to control their decisions.152 This distinction between appointment
and control applies to electors as well.153 Therefore, states’ power to appoint
electors does not include the power to remove or control them.154

141. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802 (1995).
142. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 939.
143. See id.
144. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–
64 (1926); Baca, 935 F.3d at 940.
145. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–64; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010) (ruling that the president is “responsib[le] to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed” and that “the President therefore must have some
‘power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible’” (quoting Myers,
272 U.S. at 117)).
146. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 940.
147. See id. at 941.
148. See id.
149. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XII, with id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
150. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
151. See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 592 (1996).
152. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
153. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952) (remarking that promises may be “legally
unenforceable because [they are] violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector
under the Constitution, Art. II § 1, to vote as he [or she] may choose in the electoral college”).
154. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 941 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.).
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3. The Original Intent of the Framers That Electors Should Exercise
Judgment Has Been Affirmed by History
The Electoral College was seemingly based on other models that granted
electors independence. One model, known to many of the framers, was the
system instituted in Maryland in 1776, which explicitly granted electors
independence.155 The Maryland Constitution required electors “in their
judgment and conscience” to vote for the state senators they “believe[d] best
qualified for the office.”156 In expressing that the framers approved of the
Maryland system, Alexander Hamilton remarked that it was “much appealed
to.”157 James Madison referred to Maryland’s system in arguing for the
national system at the Constitutional Convention.158
A reading of many of The Federalist Papers reveals that the framers
understood electors to be independent.159 In Federalist No. 68, Hamilton
described the process of choosing an executive that most avoided “cabal,
intrigue, and corruption.”160 According to Hamilton, this process, described
as an “investigation,” should be left to people “most capable of analyzing the
qualities” of the executive “acting under circumstances favorable to
deliberation.”161 The electors would “be most likely to possess the
information and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation.”162
He expressly rejected the prospect of “any pre-established body” selecting
the executive and insisted that the executive be chosen by people who were
selected for the sole purpose of doing so.163
Other writings in The Federalist Papers are consistent with Federalist No.
68 in assuming elector independence. In Federalist No. 60, Hamilton
described the method for choosing the president, separate from the state
legislatures choosing the Senate, as “by electors chosen for that purpose by
the people.”164 Hamilton anticipated that the two methods would be different
in that state legislatures would not choose the president by “bound proxies”
in the form of binding statutes.165 In Federalist No. 64, John Jay described
electors as “the most enlightened and respectable citizens” and noted that
they would possess “extensive and accurate information relative to men and
characters” so as to have “equal marks of discretion and discernment.”166
155. See Delahunty, supra note 118, at 171–72.
156. MD. CONST. of 1776 art. XVIII.
157. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 41, at 289.
158. See generally JAMES MADISON, Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution
for Virginia, in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 649 (Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962).
159. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 971 (1997) (declaring that The Federalist
Papers are one of the most important sources for interpreting the original intent of the
Constitution).
160. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 37, at 411.
161. Id. at 410.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898).
165. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 952–53 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.).
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 389 (John Jay) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898).
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In the ratification debate around the country, there were many framers that,
when referring to presidential electors, considered them independent.167
John Dickinson, an influential framer in Pennsylvania, in his “Fabius” letters
supporting ratification of the Constitution, described electors’ roles in a way
consistent with elector independence.168 Roger Sherman, another influential
framer in Connecticut, wrote that the president would be “reelected as often
as the electors shall think fit.”169 In other ratifying conventions around the
country, many supporters and opponents of the Constitution thought of the
electors as independent and explained that the electors would choose the
president.170 While the statements of the framers themselves have merit, the
affirmation by constitutional scholar and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story
reveals an acceptance that the framers understood electors to be
independent.171
Based on the first few elections, the public and the framers assumed elector
independence. In the first election, there was little debate that George
Washington would be chosen, but Hamilton realized that the Constitution
allowed electors to vote for two people for president.172 Since Hamilton
believed that this provision would result in a tie, he went around the country
convincing some electors to vote just for Washington.173 Using Hamilton’s
actions as an example, in 1800, Aaron Burr tried to persuade electors to vote
only for him.174 Additionally, some early candidates for elector took the

167. See KURODA, supra note 36, at 19, 21. In assuming elector independence, some of the
framers argued that the requirement that electors can only vote for one candidate from their
states “was a constraint on the free exercise of judgment.” Id. at 19. Others described the
electors as “[i]ndependent and free from undue influence.” Id. at 21.
168. 2 JOHN DICKINSON, The Letters of Fabius, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN
DICKINSON 67, 85 (Wilmington, Bonsal & Niles 1801) (“The electors may throw away their
votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly
revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interest of their country.”).
169. A Citizen of New Haven, Observations on the New Federal Constitution, CONN.
COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION: CONNECTICUT 524, 524 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978).
170. For example, James Wilson stated that the electors would be free from corruption,
implying that they would be independent free agents. See Convention of Pennsylvania, in 2
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 412, 473–74 (Washington, Jonathan Elliot 1836) (statement of James Wilson).
171. Justice Story observed “that in no respect have the enlarged and liberal views of the
framers of the constitution, and the expectations of the public, when it was adopted, been so
completely frustrated, as in the practical operation of the system, so far as relates to the
independence of the electors in the electoral colleges.” See STORY, supra note 32, § 1463.
Justice Story’s Commentaries have been informative on issues of constitutional interpretation.
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 799 (1995).
172. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 21.
173. Hamilton wrote that “[e]verybody is aware of that defect in the constitution which
renders it possible that the man intended for Vice President may in fact turn up President.” Id.
174. Conflicting accounts say that Burr possibly attempted to convince electors in New
Jersey, New York, and South Carolina to switch their votes to him. See JAMES CHEETHAM,
VIEW OF THE POLITICAL CONDUCT OF AARON BURR 44 (New York, Denniston & Cheetham
1802); see also CHARLES A. O’NEIL, THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 84 (New York, G.
P. Putnam’s Sons 1887).
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view that they would be entitled to exercise judgment in casting their
ballots.175
The new process designed under the Twelfth Amendment did nothing to
change these early assumptions and practices.176 Additionally, many
comments during the ratification debate of the Twelfth Amendment suggest
that electors could exercise discretion. Many members of Congress referred
to electors making choices and to the criteria they could use in making those
choices.177 Some members believed that electors had a duty to vote for the
most qualified person.178 Members mentioned the risk of electors being
bribed or enticed to vote for a candidate who might not be the best
candidate.179 One congressman even suggested that electors be given a
second chance to vote if no majority was reached as an alternative to having
the House decide the election.180 Taken together, these statements suggest a
prevailing sentiment that electors could exercise discretion in casting their
ballots.
Congress reaffirmed this sentiment more than one hundred years later with
the ratification and implementation of the Twenty-Third Amendment, which
granted the District of Columbia electors equal to the number granted to the
least populous state.181 Though there was no mention of elector
independence in the House and Senate during the ratification of the TwentyThird Amendment, two representatives confirmed that its language closely
mirrors the language of the Twelfth Amendment, which suggests that
Congress wanted it to have the same meaning.182 Furthermore, even though
Congress passed a binding statute, representatives have treated the statute
merely as “a strong moral suasion . . . [with] no legal effect.”183
175. In 1792, electors in North Carolina and Virginia met and debated the merits of two
presidential candidates. See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD
FOR AMERICA 19 (2004).
176. Congress was more concerned with electors’ strategic voting inverting the presidential
and vice-presidential candidates, which was a real worry based on the accounts from the 1796
and 1800 elections. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 27; see also 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 87, 98,
186 (1803).
177. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 736 (statement of Rep. Holland) (stating that electors
“exercis[e] their rationality as to the application of either person to any specific office”).
178. See, e.g., id. at 709 (statement of Rep. Lowndes) (preferring electors to vote for “men
of high character”); id. at 752 (statement of Rep. Griswold) (stating that electors have “the
great and solemn duty . . . to give their votes for two men who shall be best qualified”).
179. See, e.g., id. at 174 (statement of Sen. Tracy) (worrying that “by the force of intrigue
and faction, the Electors may be induced to scatter their votes”); id. at 692 (statement of Rep.
Purviance) (fearing that, eventually, electors could be bought “by promises or ample
compensation”).
180. See id. at 132–33 (statement of Sen. Hillhouse).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
182. See 106 CONG. REC. 12,553, 12,558, 12,571 (1960).
183. See To Amend the Act of August 12, 1955, Relating to Elections in the District of
Columbia: Hearing on H.R. 5955 Before the H.R. Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the D.C.,
87th Cong. 133 (1961) (statement of Rep. Huddleston). The law provides no legal
consequences but requires that an elector must “take an oath or solemnly affirm that he or she
will vote for the candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to represent, and it shall
be his or her duty to vote in such a manner in the electoral college.” D.C. CODE § 11001.08(g)(2) (2020). In 2000, Congress declined to enforce this binding statute when one of
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Congress has also never failed to count a faithless elector and has only
debated the issue once.184 In 1969, six senators and thirty-seven
representatives objected to a North Carolina vote for George Wallace even
though Richard Nixon won the state’s popular vote.185 There was an
extensive debate, but many members of both houses thought that electors
were independent.186 The House voted 228 to 170 and the Senate voted 58
to 33 to accept the vote.187 On many occasions, Congress has affirmed
elector independence through its statements, its inability to pass any
amendments or legislation, and its inaction in faithless elector scenarios.188
B. The Constitutionality of Binding Statutes
This section presents the main argument that binding statutes are
constitutional because a state has plenary authority over its electors. The
historical usage of this state authority and the practical implications of the
Electoral College support this understanding.
1. Nothing in the Twelfth Amendment Prohibits Binding Statutes
Nothing in the text of the Twelfth Amendment suggests that electors have
the discretion to vote without limitation by the state.189 For primary
elections, the Supreme Court, in Ray, explicitly rejected “the argument that
the Twelfth Amendment demands absolute freedom for the elector to vote
his own choice, uninhibited by a pledge” because of the “long-continued
practical interpretation of the constitutional propriety” of pledges.190 While
the Court left open the question of whether pledges are enforceable under the
Twelfth Amendment, nothing in the Ray decision suggests that pledges
would not be.191
its electors abstained from voting. See Brief for Appellants at 48, Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State,
935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518)
(mem.).
184. See Electoral College, supra note 17; see also 163 CONG. REC. H185–89 (daily ed.
Jan. 6, 2017) (counting the faithless votes from 2016).
185. See generally 115 CONG. REC. 146 (1969).
186. See, e.g., id. at 148 (statement of Rep. McColloch) (“[T]he electors are constitutionally
free and independent in choosing the President and Vice President.”); id. at 157 (statement of
Rep. Poff) (“However, this language [of Article II, § 1, cl. 2] does not empower the States to
deprive electors, once appointed, of their free choice in the electoral college.”); id. at 203–04
(statement of Sen. Ervin) (stating that the Constitution makes clear that Congress cannot “take
what was an ethical obligation and convert it into a constitutional obligation”).
187. See id. at 170, 246.
188. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 46, at 131 (stating that Congress has offered over
513 amendments regarding the Electoral College, but only one—the Twelfth Amendment—
passed).
189. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 814 (Wash. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v.
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.).
190. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–29 (1952).
191. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 816; see also Koller v. Brown, 224 F. Supp. 3d 871,
878–79 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Though the constitutionality of general election pledges for
electors was left undecided in Ray, it is possible if not likely the Court would apply the same
realistic approach when examining state-imposed restrictions on presidential electors.”).
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Further, the notion that the term “ballot” suggests that electors have a right
to secrecy and discretion is disputable.192 Since the Twelfth Amendment
requires that electors vote distinctly for president and vice president and
prohibits them from voting for two candidates from the same state,
anonymity would be impossible because Congress, when counting the votes,
would have no way of knowing whether the elector adhered to these rules.193
Additionally, historical practices of both the states and Congress provide
ample evidence for rejecting the assumption that the “ballots” are secret.194
2. States Have Broad Powers to Appoint Electors
While it is undisputed that electors perform a federal function, they do so
on behalf of the states that appoint them.195 Although the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Burroughs that electors perform a federal function, the
Court also recognized that federal authority was limited in interfering “with
the power of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which their
appointment shall be made.”196 In In re Green,197 the Court stated that “[t]he
sole function of the presidential electors is to cast, certify and transmit the
vote of the State for President and Vice President of the nation.”198 Further,
when the Supreme Court has struck down state interference with federal
functions under the Supremacy Clause, it did so because the actors were
acting under federal authority.199 In contrast, electors “act by authority of
the state that in turn receives its authority from the Federal Constitution.”200
The Supreme Court in Ray confirmed that the Constitution grants broad
authority to the states under the Twelfth Amendment.201
The states’ power to appoint electors is also plenary and exclusive.202 The
Twelfth Amendment’s language provides that the state legislature may

192. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 816 n.8.
193. Brief for Derek T. Muller as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4–5, Baca v.
Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17,
2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.) [hereinafter Muller Brief]; see also ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 57–58
(1994) (concluding that the Constitution does not require secret ballots).
194. See Muller Brief, supra note 193, at 6; Natalie Brand, Washington State Electors Vote
for Clinton, Powell, Faith Spotted Eagle, KING5 NEWS (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.king5.com/article/news/politics/washington-state-electors-vote-for-clintonpowell-faith-spotted-eagle/281-373558515 [https://perma.cc/5XCP-ARDA].
195. See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 378–80 (1890).
196. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544 (1934).
197. 134 U.S. 377 (1890).
198. Id. at 379.
199. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1992) (“[A] federal function derived
from the Federal Constitution . . . transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the
people of a State.”); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920).
200. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1952).
201. Id.; see also Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
202. See Ray, 343 U.S. at 227; McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35; see also Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968) (stating that states have “broad powers to regulate voting, which may
include laws relating to the qualification and functions of electors”).
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appoint electors “in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”203
Therefore, this power to appoint could encompass the power to remove. If it
did not, then the states would have no ability to enforce their authority over
their electors.204 Additionally, the analogy comparing electors to federal
judges or senators (appointed by the state legislatures before the Seventeenth
Amendment) is seemingly incorrect. Judges and senators are federal officers
protected by specific constitutional provisions against removal or the
attachment of certain conditions.205
The ability to add qualifications or conditions to electors may also be
permitted under the Constitution. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits states
from attaching a condition or qualification to the appointment of electors.206
In fact, the Supreme Court, in McPherson, determined that states have the
power to “define the method of effecting the object” of appointing the
electors.207 Because the states have this exclusive power to appoint, they are
permitted to attach conditions, such as those binding electors to the state’s
popular vote.208 Further, even the Tenth Circuit originally rejected this
argument by concluding that “a statutory requirement to vote in a certain
way . . . is more in the way of a duty than a qualification.”209
3. An Inconsistent Viewpoint Among the Framers and a Consistent
Understanding in History Suggest That States Can Bind Electors
Since the framers did not contemplate the modern-day concepts of political
parties, national primary campaigns, pledges, or faithless electors, they never
had reason to impose any restrictions on states binding their electors.210
Further, such contemplation did not take place at any point during the
Constitutional Convention, where an issue like this would have been
raised.211

203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also 115 CONG. REC. 163 (1969) (statement of Rep.
Fraser) (“This language is a general grant of power, broadly drawn, which does not
circumscribe the procedures under which the States may choose electors.”).
204. See Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1990) (“The power to remove is, in
the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to appoint.”);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“[E]very right, when withheld, must
have a remedy . . . .”).
205. Brief for Appellee at 44, Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019),
cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.).
206. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
207. See McPherson, 146 U.S. 1 at 27.
208. See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular
Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 678 (1996) (“The states’ constitutional power to appoint electors
would appear to include the power to bind them.”).
209. Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-cv-02986-WYD-NYW, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23391,
at *13–14 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016).
210. See Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1653, 1658 (2002).
211. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85. Robert M. Hardaway further argues that “[i]t
was doubtless envisioned that the entire process of electing electors and determining their
characteristics would be an evolutionary one.” Id.
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During the ratifying conventions and the debates about the Constitution,
the framers expressed contradictory views on the role of presidential
electors.212 Despite the strong suggestion that Hamilton intended electors to
be independent, he also expressed in Federalist No. 68 the idea that “the
people should operate in the choice” of the president.213 Additionally, in
Federalist No. 45, James Madison wrote that the state legislatures “must in
all cases have a great share in [the president’s] appointment, and will,
perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it.”214 Along with Madison,
other framers such as James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Roger Sherman
also expressed the sentiment that the president would be elected by the
people, which seemingly contradicts the belief that electors would be
independent.215
The experience during the first years of the Electoral College, before the
ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, suggests that electors did not have
discretion.216 As early as the first election, electors made pledges to specific
candidates and were not known to exhibit absolute discretion in voting for
the president.217 In subsequent elections, the public understood electors to
be pledged to a certain party and expected them to support their
candidates.218
212. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (writing that conflicting statements on both sides of an issue cannot be readily
relied on).
213. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 37, at 410. Some commentators have explained
that Hamilton sometimes expressed contradictory views based on the audience he was trying
to persuade to ratify the Constitution. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85–86.
214. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 287 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898).
215. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 15–16. For example, on January 7, 1787, Roger
Sherman wrote in The Connecticut Courant that the president would be appointed “in a
manner . . . wisely adapted to concentrate the general voice of the people” and that the
president “depends upon the people.” A Citizen of New Haven, supra note 169, at 532.
Another example occurred when Hamilton advocated for ratification in New York, stating that
“[t]he legislatures are to provide the mode of electing the President, and must have a great
influence over the electors.” Convention of New York, in THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 170, at 211, 304
(statement of Alexander Hamilton).
216. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (expressing the idea that the
actions of some of the framers shortly after the Constitution’s ratification are strong evidence
of constitutional meaning and intent).
217. Most electors informally pledged loyalty to a certain party. For example, a
Pennsylvania Federalist slate of electors pledged to vote for someone—presumably John
Adams—who would continue the policies of George Washington. O’NEIL, supra note 174, at
65. This slate produced the nation’s first “faithless elector,” Samuel Miles, who was pressured
to fulfill the will of the people of Pennsylvania who voted for Thomas Jefferson. See id.
Reacting to Miles’s decision to ignore his pledge, a critic in a Philadelphia newspaper wrote,
“What, do I chuse [sic] Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas
Jefferson shall be President? No! I chuse [sic] him to act, not think.” BENNETT, supra note
27, at 102; see also Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 948 (10th Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.). Another newspaper, the New
York Diary, expressed disappointment that the election was not a “decided expression of the
public voice” and that a uniform rule was needed. See O’NEIL, supra note 174, at 66.
218. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) (“[E]xperience soon demonstrated
that . . . [electors] were so chosen simply to register the will of the appointing power in respect
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One reason that the public expected electors to transmit the state’s popular
vote was the widespread use of the “short-form” presidential ballot.219 A
short-form ballot is a ballot that only contains the names of the presidential
and vice-presidential candidates, excluding the names of the electors.220 A
vote for the party’s candidates is a vote for that party’s electors.221 First
created by Nebraska in 1917, the development of these types of ballots
simplified the ballot for the average voter.222 The Supreme Court, in Ray,
recognized this reality and determined that this practice weighed “heavily in
considering the constitutionality of a pledge.”223 Since most states do not
print the names of electors on the ballots, voters are choosing unknown
people who they expect to vote for their party’s nominee.224
As Congress debated the Twelfth Amendment, most congressmen knew
that pledges were being used during elections and did not include anything
in the Amendment to prohibit the practice.225 One congressman remarked
that “[w]ise and virtuous as were the members of the Convention, experience
has shown that the [Electoral College] therein adopted cannot be carried into
operation” and “[t]herefore, practically, the very thing is adopted, intended
by this amendment.”226 Many other statements from legislators also
indicated that electors were agents of the people and did not have the ability
to exercise discretion.227 At the time the Twelfth Amendment was ratified,
there were also state laws that replaced or fined electors who failed to carry
out their duties.228 Despite substantial debate, the Twelfth Amendment did

of a particular candidate.”); see also 115 CONG. REC. 149 (1969) (statement of Rep. Celler)
(“This traditional ministerial function of the electors has become sacred.”). James Russell
Lowell, an elector in 1876, said of his decision to vote for Rutherford B. Hayes and not Samuel
Tilden:
I have no choice, and am bound in honor to vote for Hayes, as the people who chose
me expected me to do. They did not choose me because they had confidence in my
judgment, but because they thought they knew what that judgment would be. It is
a plain question of trust.
BENNETT, supra note 27, at 103.
219. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 17.
220. See Spencer D. Albright, The Presidential Short Ballot, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 955,
955 (1940).
221. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-100 (McKinney 2020).
222. See Albright, supra note 220, at 956, 958.
223. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952).
224. See The Electoral College, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/the-electoral-college.aspx#2016%20dates
[https://perma.cc/ST6S-8VXJ].
225. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
226. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1289 (1802) (statement of Rep. Mitchell).
227. See 115 CONG. REC. 162 (1969) (statement of Sen. Breckinridge) (“If any principle is
more sacred and all-important for free government it is that elections should be as direct as
possible . . . . And if it were practicable to act without any agents in the choice, that would be
preferable even to the choice by Electors.”); id. at 163 (statement of Rep. Clopton) (“The
Electors are the organs, who, acting from a certain and unquestioned knowledge . . . select and
announce those particular citizens, and affix to them by their votes and evidence of the degree
of public confidence which is bestowed upon them.”).
228. See Muller Brief, supra note 193, at 16.
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not address whether these pledges were prohibited or whether states were
restricted in enacting these types of laws.229
Congress has also given the states broad power to appoint their electors.
Congress has passed legislation giving the states exclusive power to make a
“final determination” over “any controversy or contest” over the appointment
of an elector.230 Additionally, when Congress passed the Twenty-Third
Amendment, it also passed a law that binds the District of Columbia’s
electors to the district’s popular vote.231 One court reasoned that this
indicates that Congress explicitly favors binding an elector’s vote to the
popular vote of the state.232
Additionally, while it is true that Congress has never failed to count a
faithless vote, it is also true that Congress has never failed to count a vote
that was bound by state law.233 Congress has objected to electoral votes
numerous times in the past, but no electoral votes have ever been
overturned.234 In the 1969 debate over the North Carolina elector who voted
for George Wallace over Richard Nixon, Congress ultimately counted the
single Wallace vote but did so in large part because North Carolina had no
binding statute.235
III. ALL POLITICS (SHOULD BE) LOCAL
The Supreme Court’s narrow ruling in Ray, which limited its decision to
primary elections, led the Tenth Circuit to override decades of practice and
state law.236 This Part advocates for the Washington State Supreme Court’s
position that states have exclusive control over electors and that binding
statutes are constitutional. It analyzes the strongest arguments for this
position and addresses certain arguments not discussed by the courts.
Finally, it implores the Supreme Court to definitively rule on the issue and
discusses the effects that such a ruling might have on future elections.

229. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931) (“The fact that an instrument
drawn with such meticulous care . . . does not contain any such limiting phrase . . . is
persuasive evidence that no qualification was intended.”).
230. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2018) (stating that state laws that make a “final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning” electors are “conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting”).
231. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.08(g)(2) (2020).
232. See Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-cv-02986-WYD-NYW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
177991, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 21, 2016) (“Federal law supports the notion that the State’s
requirement that presidential electors pledge to vote for a particular candidate, in conformity
with State law, is constitutional.”).
233. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H185–89 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017).
234. See generally 115 CONG. REC. 146 (1969) (debating the electoral vote in North
Carolina).
235. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Jonas) (“[T]he responsibility rests on the State of North
Carolina and the other States of the Union to make it impossible in the future for the election
of a President of the United States to turn on the whim or predilection of individual electors.”);
id. at 149 (statement of Rep. McColloch) (“But what law—State or Federal—did he violate?
I find none.”).
236. See supra Parts I.D, II.A.
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A. More Than Two Hundred Years of Practical Experience Favors State
Control over Electors and Binding Statutes
The universal and unchallenged use of the presidential short-form ballot is
a strong indication that electors should not be independent.237 Since 1860,
states have chosen to appoint their electors according to the will of the state’s
popular vote.238 With the advent of the short-form presidential ballot in
1917, excluding the names of electors from the ballot further supports the
argument that electors cannot have the independence to choose whomever
they want for president.239 Most voters assume that they are casting their
votes for the candidates named on the ballot. No state ballot indicates that
citizens are actually casting votes for electors who may ignore their votes and
choose someone else. The concept of the unknown elector strongly suggests
that electors simply exist to register the will of the popular vote. Allowing
independent electors would thus be tantamount to a fraud upon the voter
because their vote could be ignored in favor of another candidate. Voters
likely do not know who the electors are. Additionally, because electors are
relatively unknown, they cannot be held accountable by the voting public like
other elected officials.240 The unchallenged use of the short-ballot
perpetuates the understanding that electors should follow the popular vote.241
Further, the long-standing interpretation of an elector’s role by the framers,
Congress, and the courts gives no indication that electors can vote contrary
to state law or the popular vote. During the Constitutional Convention, the
framers did not discuss an elector’s independent role.242 Afterward, many
framers disagreed as to electors’ exact role.243 Scholars often cite Federalist
No. 68 as evidence that the framers understood electors to be independent.244
This, however, is the work of one framer—Alexander Hamilton—who was
known to tailor his writing to its intended audience.245 Other framers, such
as James Madison, James Wilson, and Roger Sherman, argued that the
president should ultimately be chosen by the people, contradicting their own
previous statements.246 The opinion of one framer in one piece of writing
should not be taken as authoritative proof of the framers’ collective intent
where contradictory statements by other framers exist.247
237. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
238. South Carolina was the last state to allow its state legislature to choose its electors,
permitting this activity until 1860. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 46, at 248.
239. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part I.B; see also supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text. Notably,
Alexander Hamilton never expressed the view that electors should be independent during the
Convention. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85.
243. See supra notes 212–18 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Hardaway presents an interesting
argument undermining the idea that one framer’s view on a constitutional issue should be the
authoritative source. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85–86. He explains that Hamilton
also advocated that the president should be elected for life and that if reformers were to
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In the early years of the United States, electors were not known to have
independence. In the first election, Alexander Hamilton, for political
reasons, tried to persuade electors to cast a single vote for George
Washington instead of casting votes for both Washington and Adams.248
While this may suggest that Hamilton understood electors to be free agents,
it may indicate more significantly that he did not actually expect electors to
use their own judgment. In fact, he did not want the electors to extensively
debate the merits of each candidate.249 Notably, in Federalist No. 68,
Hamilton explained that electors should be “free from any sinister bias” and
that they were to choose a president after a thorough “investigation.”250
Hamilton’s actions undermined his words; there was no investigation here.
When Congress debated the Twelfth Amendment, many of the original
framers then living did not discuss the independence of electors, even though
pledges and political parties were already an important part of elections at
the time.251 These framers extensively debated revising Article II’s provision
that electors must vote for two candidates for president but did not debate
explicitly restricting a state’s broad authority over electors.252 Congress
ratified the Twelfth Amendment merely as a bookkeeping provision to
eliminate the confusion experienced during the 1800 election, when the
House went through thirty-six rounds of voting to choose the president.253
They did not write anything into the Constitution that prohibited these
pledges, despite knowing of their existence and their widespread usage.254
Congress has the exclusive right to object to an electoral vote, and courts
should not interfere with Congress’s constitutional right to dispute electoral
votes.255 Congress has historically assumed that states have exclusive
authority over electors and that electors’ votes should mirror the popular
votes of their states.256 In the 1969 debate over a faithless elector in North
Carolina, Congress counted the faithless vote.257 This singular vote,
however, should not suggest direct congressional acceptance of elector
independence over state authority. In voting to count the faithless vote, many
members cited North Carolina’s lack of a law binding its electors.258 If there
propose a president-for-life amendment today, “doubtless [these reformers] could also cite
Hamilton’s view in that regard as authoritative.” See id. at 86.
248. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 172–73.
250. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 37, at 410.
251. See supra Parts I.B., II.A.3, II.B.3.
252. See supra notes 176–80, 225–29 and accompanying text.
253. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 205, at 45; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 46, at
40.
254. See supra Part II.B.1.
255. See supra note 230; see also 115 CONG. REC. 147 (1969) (statement of Rep.
Edmondson) (observing that counting votes is “an absolute power possessed by the House and
the Senate”).
256. See supra Part II.B.3.
257. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 162 (1969) (statement of Rep. Galifianakis) (“The first
question is whether or not there are, in the laws of the State of North Carolina, provisions
which require an elector to cast his vote for the candidates of the party he represents.”); id. at

1950

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

had been a law, it might have changed their vote.259 Additionally, some
members agreed that states can enact laws to prevent faithless votes.260
In 2017, many legislators attempted to object to electoral votes from
different states, but Congress did not debate them.261 Despite the
controversies regarding binding statutes in California, Colorado, Minnesota,
and Washington, no representative raised any objections to these electoral
votes.262 While it is true that Congress has never rejected a faithless elector’s
vote, it is equally true that the only time a state enforced its binding statute
and removed a faithless voter (which is what happened in Colorado in 2016),
Congress nevertheless accepted that vote.263
Congress also explicitly approved of binding statutes when it enacted the
District of Columbia’s binding statute after the Twenty-Third
Amendment.264 Even though there is no enforcement mechanism in the
binding law, the enactment of the law reveals that Congress wants electors to
manifest the will of a state’s popular vote.265 Despite one representative’s
statement that the law would only have “moral suasion,” the statute is an
implicit approval of the long-standing practice of binding statutes.266
Historically, courts have also granted states exclusive authority over their
electors and have favored voters over elector independence.267 In Ray, while
ruling on pledges in primaries, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
the Twelfth Amendment demanded absolute freedom for electors.268 The
Court also ruled that the Constitution did not grant a right for electors to vote
based on their individual preferences.269 In his dissent, Justice Jackson
ignored the framers’ numerous inconsistent statements about elector
independence and oversimplified the Constitution in stating that it implied
elector independence.270 While he was correct that custom is not sufficient
authority to amend the Constitution, a “constitutional generality” or
vagueness, such as the Twelfth Amendment’s language describing the
elector’s role, should be interpreted with an eye toward years of political
166 (statement of Rep. Fountain) (“A moral obligation and a legal requirement . . . are two
different things.”).
259. See, e.g., id. at 162 (statement of Rep. Henderson) (“[B]ut in the absence of . . . a State
law spelling out clearly the duties of an elector, he has the legal, if not the moral, right to vote
as he chooses.”); id. at 167 (statement of Rep. Fountain) (“And in the absence of any such
binding authority, Congress cannot alter the electoral vote of North Carolina.”).
260. See id. at 150 (statement of Rep. Lennon) (“So, then, it becomes crystal clear that until
such time as the State legislatures of the several States act . . . we are powerless to do
anything.”).
261. See 163 CONG. REC. H186–89 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017).
262. Some members of Congress attempted to challenge votes in the following states:
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See generally id.
263. See id.
264. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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practice.271 Justice Jackson also considerably overstated the majority’s
ruling as “entrench[ing] the worst features of the system.”272 The majority’s
decision was simply a practical remedy for a quirk in the electoral system
that was seemingly not going to be fixed by constitutional amendment or by
Congress. Additionally, nearly all federal and state courts before and after
Ray have consistently upheld the constitutionality of binding statutes.273 In
2019, however, the Tenth Circuit overturned Colorado’s binding law and
became the first court in history to strike down any binding statute, despite
the long history of explicit approval of Congress and the framers.274
B. How Binding Statutes Address Constitutional Inconsistences and
Concerns
A state’s authority over its electors is exclusive and comprehensive.275
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from establishing elector
pledges or removing an elector who refuses to comply with the conditions of
his or her appointment.276 The Twelfth Amendment restricts an elector in
two ways: (1) an elector must vote separately for president and vice president
and (2) the two candidates must be from different states.277 These
limitations, however, are not meant to be exhaustive because the states have
plenary power over elector appointment.278 The two leading Supreme Court
cases that restrict the addition of conditions not explicitly expressed in the
Constitution are not applicable to electors since the cases dealt with elected
officials; electors are distinguishable because they are appointed.279
Furthermore, if the framers had wanted to prohibit binding statutes, they
could have explicitly stated as much in the Constitution. The framers were
aware of the pre-Constitution Maryland model, under which electors had
complete discretion in choosing state senators.280 Had the framers intended
electors to have complete discretion, they could have used the explicit
Maryland language.
Additionally, binding statutes directly address some of the concerns the
framers had during the convention. In the debate regarding the selection of
the president, the framers were concerned that the legislative branch would
have too much control over the executive branch.281 These concerns led the
271. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 233 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 234.
273. See supra Part I.D.
274. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
277. See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 206–09 and accompanying text.
279. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“[E]ach state shall appoint . . . a number of electors.”)
(emphasis added); cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1996) (giving Congress the
power to attach conditions to its constitutional spending power). See generally U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (resting on explicit language in Article I, § 2);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (limiting congressional, not state authority).
280. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part I.B.
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framers to substitute the Electoral College for their original proposal, in
which the legislators would directly choose the president.282 Binding statutes
do not direct an elector to vote for a specific candidate or party. They direct
an elector to vote based on the state’s popular vote. Thus, the effect of the
binding statutes is to have the voters of the state, not the state legislatures,
choose the president. The fear that the executive would be unduly influenced
by the legislators is unfounded since these laws place the ultimate authority
with the people of the state.283
Binding statutes also diminish corruption concerns. In Federalist No. 68,
Hamilton endorsed the practice of choosing an executive that would most
avoid “cabal, intrigue, and corruption.”284 If electors were not bound by state
law, they would certainly be more susceptible to corruption.285 What would
stop an ambitious losing presidential candidate from bribing electors to
ignore their pledges and vote for them? Such a distressing scenario is not so
far-fetched. For example, before the election in 2000, both Al Gore and
George W. Bush developed a strategy to persuade electors to vote against
their state’s popular vote.286 Electors are less likely to experience nefarious
or political influence with binding statutes in place because these laws
institute legal mechanisms preventing an elector from pursuing selfish goals.
While a strict interpretation of the use of the term “electors” in Article II
of the Constitution favors treating them the same as the “electors” referenced
in Article I, certain facts suggest that Article II electors should not be treated
the same way.287 Article I electors (or the general public) vote for Congress,
and no one has ever disputed the unconstitutionality of laws directing how
these “electors” can vote. Article I electors, however, cast their votes on
secret ballots, which would be impossible for Article II electors based on
procedure.288 Electors cannot vote for two candidates from the same state.289
The only way to enforce this provision is to look at each elector’s ballot to
ensure that they have complied.290 Furthermore, Article II electors are
appointed by the state—as opposed to Article I electors, who constitute the
general public.291
C. Too Close to Call: Unintended Consequences and a Supreme Court
Ruling
Ultimately, there are only two ways to settle the issue of the
constitutionality of elector independence and binding statutes:
a
constitutional amendment or a Supreme Court ruling. Because of the
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
See Alexander, supra note 51, at 162–63.
See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
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rigorous process for amending the Constitution, the easier route would be a
Supreme Court ruling.292 The Court will hear the Baca case on April 28,
2020, and should issue an opinion on June 29, 2020.293 Some argue that by
reaching an opinion in June, six months before the presidential election and
before either party’s nominating convention, the Court will preserve its
impartiality by resolving the issue “outside of the white-hot scrutiny of a
contested presidential election.”294
While this Note advocates that the Court should rule in the states’ favor, it
acknowledges some negative effects that such a ruling could have. If the
Court holds binding statutes and their enforcement constitutional, a state
could conceivably enact a law binding electors to vote for a specific party.295
The New Jersey and New York state legislatures have already introduced
partisan bills.296 These bills would prevent electors from voting for
candidates who do not release copies of their recent tax returns.297 A
favorable Supreme Court ruling could open the door to many states
proposing similar partisan statutes.
This Note argues, however, that slippery-slope concerns about states
passing binding statutes motivated by partisan objectives are unfounded.
Laws binding electors to the popular vote of a state have less nefarious
purposes. These laws are neutral because they are only meant to reflect the
popular sentiment that “history has now favored the voter.”298
Restricting an elector’s independence may also create unanticipated
complications in the case of a candidate who dies after Election Day but
before the electors’ meeting in December.299 Binding statutes would force
electors into the absurd position of voting for a deceased candidate.
Representative William Moore McCulloch expressed this concern during the
1969 debate over the North Carolina faithless elector, saying that the
electoral system “necessitates that the electors remain free and independent
because the people’s choice may have died” between November and
December.300 While resolving this concern is outside the scope of this Note,
a ruling that would require electors to comply with binding statutes might
pose complications. In this regard, a ruling in the states’ favor could,
however, force legislators to directly address the issue of a candidate’s
292. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
293. See supra note 13.
294. See Adam Liptak, ‘Faithless Electors’ Could Tip the 2020 Election. Will the Supreme
Court Stop Them?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/us/
politics/supreme-court-faithless-electors-2020.html [https://perma.cc/2BBB-J65L].
295. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 553 (1969) (stating that nothing could
prevent the passage of laws that would restrict a communist or a socialist from being elected
to Congress).
296. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 183, at 55–56. In 2016, this was a partisan issue
because the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, refused to release his tax returns.
297. A court, however, would likely find these bills unconstitutional because they would
explicitly add a qualification for president that is not stated in the Constitution. See supra notes
128–31 and accompanying text.
298. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
299. See supra note 60.
300. See 115 CONG. REC. 148 (1969) (statement of Rep. McColloch).
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potential death—an area of presidential election law that has received little
attention.301
A narrow ruling by the Court could alleviate some of these concerns. The
Court could, for example, rule that certain binding statutes are constitutional,
while others are not. While some binding statutes impose penalties on
faithless electors, most have no consequences.302 Further, the penalties for
faithless electors differ based on the enforcement mechanisms.303
Ultimately, the Court could tailor its ruling to the different penalties. The old
law in Washington that imposed a fine may be more likely to pass
constitutional muster than the Colorado law, which removes an elector and
cancels their vote.304 The Court could find that the Colorado law directly
interferes with the voting process outlined in the Twelfth Amendment, while
the old Washington law does not because it imposed a fine after voting
ended.305 Other states might want to model their binding statutes after the
old Washington law because the pressure of a severe fine could produce the
same desired result as more enforcement-driven laws.
A ruling against the states may focus attention on the shortcomings of the
Electoral College.306 Lawrence Lessig, a Harvard professor who filed a brief
on behalf of the electors from Washington, believes that a ruling for elector
independence “could also convince both sides that it is finally time to step up
and modify the Constitution to address this underlying problem.”307 Similar
to Justice Jackson in Ray, Lessig and others who agree with his position
believe that, if the Court ruled in favor of the states, it would only mask a
small defect and ignore a system that is wholly wrong and in need of
substantial reform.308 This argument, however, is too pessimistic. A ruling
for the states would simply affirm state authority over electors in the thirtytwo states that have binding statutes. It is hard to fathom that such a ruling
would silence the prominent calls to reform the Electoral College.309
Additionally, this specific issue does not address those reformers’ main
concerns with the Electoral College. In fact, reform efforts are generally
concerned with certain states’ oversized importance in general elections and
the diminished role of other states and not with the chance that a faithless

301. See supra note 60.
302. See supra Part I.C.
303. See supra Part I.C.
304. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.330 (repealed 2019), with COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 1-4-304(5) (2020).
305. See supra note 60.
306. See Liptak, supra note 294.
307. See id.
308. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
309. Thirteen current and former 2020 Democratic presidential candidates were open to
reforming or abolishing the Electoral College. See Kevin Uhrmacher et al., Where 2020
Democrats Stand on Democratic Changes, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/voting-changes/ [https://perma.cc/
RSY8-NNU5].
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vote could tip an election.310 Just in accepting the case, the Supreme Court
has thrust the Electoral College into the spotlight in the middle of a
presidential election and intensified calls for reform.311 A ruling that affirms
state authority and the constitutionality of binding statutes would simply be
a practical remedy for a quirk in the system that would have an instant impact
on the 2020 election.
CONCLUSION
After the Tenth Circuit’s August 2019 decision, the constitutionality of
binding statutes is now, for the first time, in doubt. While a strict
interpretation of the Constitution suggests that the elector has the freedom to
vote independently, regardless of any state law, the immediate early usage
and long-standing historical understanding of an elector’s role suggest the
opposite: binding statutes and their enforcement should be recognized as
constitutional. Universal acceptance of binding statutes and short-form
ballots should overcome vague constitutional language and the framers’
inconsistent statements and actions.
This major Electoral College shortcoming is in urgent need of reform. In
2016, seven electors cast their votes for someone other than the candidate
they were required to vote for by law.312 A swing of that many electors could
have changed the outcomes of five of the previous fifty-eight presidential
elections.313 It is imperative that the Supreme Court rule on this issue and
affirm the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision before a faithless
elector changes the outcome of a presidential election.

310. For example, Senator Bernie Sanders, highlighting the importance of certain states,
stated that “presidential elections cannot be fought out in just a dozen ‘battleground’ states.”
Id.
311. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court to Hear ‘Faithless Elector’ Case, NPR (Jan. 17,
2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/17/797472072/supreme-court-to-hear-faithless-electorscase [https://perma.cc/3K2T-5X5B].
312. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
313. See Liptak, supra note 294.

